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Abstract
Although the current corruption in North Korea is keeping potential resistance 
and social disruptions under control, it may not be beneficial for North 
Korea’s economic development in the long-term. The most important reason 
is that the bribery, which is part of a daily life in North Korea, is rampant 
and is not functionally helpful to the economy as it does not contribute to 
formal sector in raising the supply of goods and services but rather remains 
within informal markets. Moreover, because bribery itself is highly common 
aspect of lives in North Korea, it takes a significant portion of household 
spending, which could be spent elsewhere for more productive uses if it 
could be avoided. Nevertheless, there is a fine equilibrium among dictators, 
authorities, and market participants that maintains the balance of the 
corruption system in place. In this backdrop, the present study examines 
whether this social change in North Korea is expected to break in the 
long-term as the corrupt relationship between authorities and market 
participants can no longer be contained by the dictator, resulting in 
destruction of the system and making transition to market economy.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite initial expectations that were inspired first by Kim Jong Il’s stroke, and by the 
abrupt and accelerated nature of Kim Jong Un’s succession process, the North Korean 
political system has remained stable so far. Neither the high-level purges (such as the 
execution of Jang Song Thaek) nor the post-2012 economic reforms have perceptibly 
weakened the regime’s political control over society. So far there were no new protests 
akin to the disturbances triggered by the “counter-reforms” of 2007-2008 and the monetary 
reform of 2009. Under such conditions, it appears more or less unlikely that the North 
Korean regime will collapse in the near future, and thus the earlier hopes of accomplishing 
national unification within a foreseeable period need to be critically revised.1)
At the same time, it is similarly necessary to acknowledge the possibility of a regime 
collapse, and make certain mental preparations for such a scenario. While the North 
Korean political system might endure for a considerably longer time than it was initially 
expected, its eventual demise, no matter when it will happen, is more likely to occur in 
the form of a collapse than in the form of a negotiated transition process. For a negotiated 
and largely peaceful transition, the ruling elite must enter talks with an opposition group 
which is at least partly organized, able to influence and (if necessary) control crowds, 
genuinely committed to peaceful change, and – last but not least – at least informally 
accepted by the leadership as a legitimate negotiating partner.
In those countries where these conditions were present (such as Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Mongolia), the transition process of 1989/1990 was mostly 
or wholly devoid of violence, and the negotiations successfully culminated in the creation 
of stable democratic systems. In contrast, those countries where the ruling Communist 
regimes were highly repressive and unwilling to accept any intellectual groups as 
negotiating partners (such as Albania and Romania) experienced a more turbulent form of 
transition in which spontaneous street protests and/or street fighting played a major or even 
dominant role.2) In these countries, intellectuals were largely unable to form dissident 
groups, and since they were often regarded as the regime’s privileged collaborators, they 
1) For an overview of such expectations, see Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit, “Preparing for Sudden Change in North 
Korea.” Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 42 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009) and Cha 
Du-hyeogn, “Instability and Regime Change: Why and How Are Regimes Ruined?” (Washington, DC: US-Korea Institute 
at SAIS, 2016).
2) For an overview of the various types of transition in Eastern Europe, see Katrina Nowak Dusek, “Negotiated or 
Stolen? Methods of Transition and Patterns of Opposition-regime Interaction in Communist Eastern Europe.” M.A. 
Thesis (Chapel Hill, MA: University of North Carolina, 2008). On Mongolia, see Morris Rossabi, Modern Mongolia 
.From Khans to Commissars to Capitalism (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2005).
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could not exert a strong influence on the impoverished and strongly dissatisfied masses, 
nor could they gain the status of an informally or formally recognized negotiating partner.3) 
Since the North Korean political system is far more similar to the second type of 
Communist regimes than to the first type, it is reasonable to expect that if the North 
Korean ruling elite ever loses its power, the DPRK’s transition process will have more in 
common with the experiences of Albania and Romania than with Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Mongolia.4) While the sudden and violent collapse of the North Korean 
regime would be definitely a less desirable scenario for the Republic of Korea than a 
negotiated and peaceful transition, it is advisable to base one’s unification plans on what is 
likely to occur, rather than on what one would prefer.
If the North Korean regime does collapse, and its demise leads to the unification of 
North and South Korea, the country’s post-unification political system will be probably 
more an extension of the existing southern system to the North (as it occurred in 
post-1990 Germany) than a partial co-existence of northern and southern state institutions 
(as it temporarily occurred in post-unification Yemen, where in 1991-1994 both the 
northern and southern armies were maintained side-by-side in an intact form, rather than 
merged into a single force). The likelihood of an absorption-type unification scenario is 
based on the following factors: (1) the South Korean constitution recognizes the ROK 
government as the sole legitimate authority in the whole country, including the territory of 
North Korea; (2) the traditions and practices of the North Korean ruling party (Korean 
Workers’ Party, KWP) are so fundamentally incompatible with democratic norms that its 
voluntary and successful transformation into a Social Democratic party(a scenario that 
occurred in several East European countries, where Social Democratic traditions were 
relatively deeply rooted) cannot be realistically expected; and (3) earlier inter-Korean 
relations were frequently marred by armed violence (see the events of 1949-1953, 
1966-1970, 1983, 1987, 1999, 2002, and 2010), and the resulting mutual distrust would 
greatly hinder the integration or co-existence of the northern and southern armed forces on 
the basis of equality.
Judging from the experiences of post-1990 Germany, the extension of the South 
Korean administration to the North is likely to encounter serious social and economic 
3) On the inability of Albanian intellectuals to play a leading role in the transition process, see Elez Biberaj, Albania in 
Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 37-39. On Romania, see Dragos 
Petrescu, Explaining the Romanian Revolution of 1989: Culture, Structure, and Contingency (Bucharest: Editura 
Enciclopedica, 2010).
4) For a comparative analysis, see Cheng Chen and Ji-Yong Lee, “Making sense of North Korea: ‘National Stalinism’ in 
comparative-historical perspective,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40 (2007), pp. 459-475.
difficulties. In the two countries mentioned above, it was hardly easy to integrate the 
population of the former Communist states into the now-dominant West German society. In 
one respect or another, both the dominant and the absorbed populations had some reasons 
to be critical of certain specific political, economic, and cultural aspects of the unification 
process, and such resentment could even fuel political extremism (see the rise of “GDR 
nostalgia” and right-wing extremism in the eastern areas of Germany). Unification brought 
a higher tax burden for the West German population and a massive rise of structural 
unemployment for East German society.5)
The “transition traumas” of East Germany had much in common with the 
socio-economic difficulties experienced in the former Soviet Bloc: Eastern Europe, the 
Community of Independent States (CIS), and Mongolia. In the East European countries, 
admission to (or association with) the European Union (EU) created conditions that were 
comparable to the situation in post-1990 East Germany. Their cooperation with EU 
broadened their economic opportunities but also carried various obligations. The 
deregulation of their state-controlled economies eliminated many jobs in the 
less-than-competitive industries, and their adaptation to EU’s legal and administrative 
requirements was often a slow and tortuous process. Notably, Albania’s transition has 
proven particularly difficult, both in the socio-economic sphere and in the political sphere, 
and these difficulties were deeply rooted in the same factors that had greatly hindered a 
negotiated transition in this country: the highly repressive nature of the Communist regime, 
the absence of civil society, and the population’s unfamiliarity with democratic governance 
and market economy. Since the Albanian Communist system had more in common with 
North Korea than any of the other East European regimes, the experiences of Albania are 
of particular relevance if one seeks to assess the prospects of the would-be integration of 
the North Korean population into South Korean society.6)
5) For comparisons between German unification and the prospects of Korean unification, see Kang Suk Rhee, “Korea's 
Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience,” Asian Survey, 33:4 (1993), pp. 360-375; Jin Min Chung and 
John D. Nagle, “Generational Dynamics and the Politics of German and Korean Unification,” The Western Political 
Quarterly, 45:4 (1992), pp. 851-867; Lars Vogel and Heinrich Best, “Political Elites in Transition and Unification: 
German Lessons for the Korean Peninsula?,” Historical Social Research, 41:3 (2016), pp. 336-367;Michael Hofmann and 
Bernd Martens, “Generations and Social Structures in Socialist Countries: The German Democratic Republic and East 
Germany in comparison with North Korea,” Historical Social Research, 41:3 (2016), pp. 318-335; Alan J. Auerbach, 
Young Jun Chun, and Ilho Yoo, “The Fiscal Burden of Korean Reunification: A Generational Accounting Approach.” 
NBER Working Paper No. 10693 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004); Seung Mo Choi and 
Max St. Brown, “Economic Impacts of Reunifications in Germany and in Korea,” Asian Economic Papers, 14:2 (2015), 
pp. 183-213.
6) On the difficulties of Albania’s transition process, see Lori E. Amy and Eglantina Gjermeni, “Where is the ‘State’ in 
Albania? The Unresolved Contradictions Confronting Civil Society in the ‘Transition’ from Communism to Free 
Markets,” Studies of Transition States and Societies, 5:1 (2013), pp. 7-21; Marsida Ashiku, “Political Transition, 
Corruption in New Democracies: Special Case Albania,” International Journal of Economic Research, 2:3 (2011), pp. 
111-124; Daniela Irrera, “The Balkanisation of Politics: Crime and Corruption in Albania.” EUI Working Paper No. 
2006/18 (Florence: European University Institute, 2006); Ermal Frasheri, “Of Knights and Squires: European Union and 
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CONTEXTUALIZING CORRUPTION IN NORTH KOREA
Since it would not have been possible to prepare a complete assessment of the 
expected difficulties of the would-be Korean unification process within the framework of 
the present study, we selected one specific problem, corruption, for analysis. Our decision 
to select this particular problem was motivated by the following considerations: Since the 
famine (1994-1998) and the breakdown of the command economy, corruption has become 
a ubiquitous problem in North Korea, affecting many segments of economic and social 
life. Scholars like Young-Ja Park defined this phenomenon as systematic corruption, that 
is, a situation where “corruption is structuralized into the state system.” This means that 
corruption is an integral element of the informal but powerful patron-client networks 
behind the formal institutions of the North Korean party-state, rather than an aberration. 
Due to the absence of the rule of law, high-ranking officials have broad discretionary 
powers, and thus their clients (or would-be clients) are strongly motivated to gain and 
retain their goodwill by paying bribes.7) While the supreme leadership periodically used 
the charge of corruption to discredit the officials who were purged for political reasons 
(see the execution of Jang Song Thaek in 2013), or to justify the “counter-reforms” 
aimed at curtailing markets (see the anti-market campaigns in 2007-2008), it made no 
systematic effort to control and reduce corruption.8) On the contrary, it rather benefited 
from these practices.
For instance, many foreign investors (including Chinese firms that are relatively 
familiar with local conditions) were defrauded by their North Korean partners and forced 
to leave the DPRK.
Actually, the North Korean directors who committed these acts against their foreign 
partners often did so because they needed to “submit a large percentage of the defrauded 
profit to the North Korean government in order to gain access to promotion 
opportunities.”9) Similarly, the security services were prone to extort money from private 
entrepreneurs by detaining them on the pretext of suppressing “economic crimes,” and 
the Modernization of Albania.” CID Research Fellow and Graduate Student Working Paper No. 81(Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University, Center for International Development, 2016).
7) Young-Ja Park, “Informal Political System in North Korea: Systematic Corruption of ‘Power-Wealth’ 
Symbiosis,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 24:1 (2015), pp. 123-156.
8) Ken E. Gause, North Korea under Kim Chong-il: Power, Politics, and Prospects for Change (Santa Barbara, CA:Praeger, 
2011), pp. 28, 68, 107, 184, 196.
9) YaoHui Wang, “Investing in the World’s Most Isolated Country: Challenges Faced by Chinese Private Investors in North 
Korea,” North Korean Review, 12:2 (2016), p. 112.
releasing them only if they paid bribes (or rather ransom).10)
At the same time, the state’s diminishing financial capabilities were as much 
responsible for the systematic corruption as its unchanged repressive capabilities. Since 
the revenues of the pre-1990 North Korean state had been based mainly on the taxes 
imposed on state-owned enterprises(SOEs) and collective farms, rather than on indirect 
taxes or personal income taxes, the post-1990 breakdown of many SOEs greatly reduced 
state revenues, and made the state increasingly unable to provide officials, teachers, 
physicians, etc. with sufficiently high salaries. Under such circumstances, persons 
belonging to the aforesaid social groups started to demand bribes from clients, pupils, 
patients, etc., for their services.11)
Nevertheless, the persistence of corruption implied not only the officials’ ability to 
extort money from citizens but also the population’s growing ability to evade 
burdensome and harmful state regulations (such as restrictions on movement, residence, 
and trade) by means of bribery.
While the relationship between security officers and private entrepreneurs was 
essentially of a predatory nature, entrepreneurs were able to forge mutually beneficial 
partnerships with local officials, factory managers, or military officers who allowed them 
to use state-owned trucks or the production facilities of SOEs for their own purposes. 
Under such conditions, private entrepreneurs were both victims and beneficiaries of the 
systematic corruption.12) It appears fairly likely that both officials and entrepreneurs have 
become so much accustomed to corruption that corrupt practices will persist for a 
substantial time after unification, even if unification leads to the replacement of the 
North Korean state apparatus and the extension of the ROK administration to the North. 
Indeed, corruption in North Korea is a combination of nearly all types of corruption: 
low-level administrative corruption (bribery to bend rules; extortion facilitated by 
bureaucratic over-regulation and obfuscation; and the misuse of licensing and inspection 
powers), asset stripping (diversion of public funds; profiteering from public 
assets;nepotism, clientelism, and the selling of positions), and state capture.13)
Corruption is daily part of life in North Korea and is tightly linked to its expanding 
10) Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Economic Crime and Punishment in North Korea. East Asia Institute Asia 
Security Initiative Working Paper 5 (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2010), pp. 3-17.
11) Jeong-Ah Cho et al., The Everyday Lives of North Koreans. KINU Studies Series 09-03 (Seoul: Korea Institute for 
National Unification, 2009), pp. 20-26.
12) Hyung- min Joo, “Visualizing the Invisible Hands: The Shadow Economy in North Korea,” Economy and Society, 39:1 
(2010), pp. 110-145.
13) For a theoretical overview, see Rasma Karklins, “Typology of Post-Communist Corruption,” Problems of 
Post-Communism, 49:4 (2002), pp. 22-32.
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market economy. According to Cho et al. (2009), the economic crisis in the 90s 
significantly changed the way of lives in North Korea for most social classes, and in the 
process, corruption has become a way of lives for most North Korean citizens for their 
survival. Importantly, the marketization in North Korea occurred through the bottom-up 
process as a way for regular citizens to make subsistence living in failing economy and 
distributive system (Soh, 2017). By having access to Chinese mobile phones in the 
border areas, it became possible to obtain external information in real-time, enabling 
much more efficient transmission of information in and out of North Korea. This 
contributed to the creation of new economic elites who uses the external information 
gained through access to the Chinese mobile phones for trade. In these process, bribes 
have been essential in avoiding punishment for using mobile phones (Kretchun & Kim, 
2012).
North Korea’s market economy has grown significantly since the late 1990s, and now 
it is estimated to account for 30 to 50% of the gross domestic product of North Korea 
(Lankov, 2016). North Korea is experiencing fairly high annual growth rate considering its 
status ranging between 1.5 to 5%. Now, there is quite active housing market, which is a 
way to amass wealth in North Korea (Lankov, 2016). With the marketization, in-flow of 
foreign goods such as South Korean made gadgets and cosmetics and foreign cultures such 
as South Korea movies and TV programs are effectively removed the propagandas of the 
North Korean authorities. Moreover, with greater access to information through illegal 
means, North Koreans are being exposed to more outside information than ever before 
(Kretchun & Kim, 2012). As a result, some political liberalization and even signs of 
income inequality have started to appear but the current regime is unlikely to suppress the 
marketization and will continue to support the market for the time being because it has 
facilitated recovery of economy. Indeed, attempted control over the market forces has failed 
in the past, and no such effort has been seen in the current Kim Jong-un regime. With 
the nearing end of state-planned economy due to the marketization in North Korea, such 
development shows that bottom-up changes are possible even under the punitive dictatorial 
government (Soh, 2017). Hence, corruption and fall of state distribution system in the 
1990s was the key trigger in nurturing natural development of marketization and brining 
signs of social changes in North Korea.
With such social changes and economic development, new class of people called “red 
capitalist” appeared in North Korea and is acting as a key factor in maintaining current 
balance of power in North Korea. According to Park (2015), “power-wealth symbiosis” 
between North Korean authorities (power or patron) and “red capitalists” (wealth or client) 
is one cause that is prolong the dictatorial government system in North Korea. The 
connection between the power and the wealthy is the basis of corruption in North Korea 
as the client (or wealthy) receives protection and privileges from the patrons (or 
authorities) in return for financial support. Within the current situation of systematic 
corruption, authorities with power and the new wealthy class borne under the marketization 
act in concert to exploit the current North Korea. However, in the long-term, it is likely 
that the new wealthy class will find it difficult to accept the excessive bribes required as 
a result of frequent fluctuations in the power structure of the regime and national policies, 
which may lead to social changes in North Korea. These new wealthy class was able to 
avert the attempts of North Korean government to curb and re-collect corrupt money by 
investing and amassing foreign currencies such as US dollar and Chinese RMB. The use 
of foreign currency increased in North Korea across different periods. These periods are 
characterized by economic shocks that occurred in 1992, 2002, and 2009 (Green, 2016). In 
the late 1980s, it was only high-ranking officials that were able to access and accumulate 
any significant foreign currencies, and foreign currencies at the time were mostly used as a 
sign of wealth. This, however, changed in the later periods. Following the currency 
revaluation in 1992, the Economic Management Improvement Measure in 2002, and 
currency reform in 2009, which greatly eroded the value of North Korean won, it became 
common for North Korean people to utilize foreign currency (RMB) in markets and to 
store foreign currency at home. While the state implemented above measures with the 
intention of taking back the corrupt money in the hands of the public, citizens driven by 
the desire to securely hold wealth increasingly adopted the use of foreign currency against 
the will of the state (Green, 2016). With such wide-spread of foreign currency uses in 
North Korea, the authorities, in effect, lost its control over corruptions between its 
government officials and its citizens. For the North Korean authorities, however, despite the 
duality of compliance as well as defiance of the doctrines of North Korea, the possibility 
of political resistance has been averted so long as they maintained the current corrupt 
system and guaranteed the survival of citizens (Cho et al., 2009).
Although the current corruption in North Korea is keeping potential resistance and 
social disruptions under control, it may not be beneficial for North Korea’s economic 
development in the long-term. The most important reason is that the bribery, which is part 
of a daily life in North Korea, is rampant and is not functionally helpful to the economy 
as it does not contribute to formal sector in raising the supply of goods and services but 
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rather remains within informal markets (Kim, 2010). Moreover, because bribery itself is 
highly common aspect of lives in North Korea, it takes a significant portion of household 
spending, which could be spent elsewhere for more productive uses if it could be avoided. 
Nevertheless, there is a fine equilibrium among dictators, authorities, and market 
participants that maintains the balance of the corruption system in place. However, this is 
expected to break in the long-term as the corrupt relationship between authorities and 
market participants can no longer be contained by the dictator, resulting in destruction of 
the system and making transition to market economy.
Historically speaking, uncontrolled corruption has played an important role in the 
destruction of communist and totalitarian regimes in the past. This means that North Korea 
may also be facing the same predicament with the rampant development of corruption 
along with the expanding marketization. For instance, Kim (1997) argued that political and 
economic failures are breeding corruptions in North Korea, and this could be the fall of 
North Korean regime unless it is brought under control. Given the fact that marketization 
and corruptions are taking place in North Korea, there are also side-effects that follows 
from their development. Kim et al.(2013) focused on the fact that corruption is not only 
related to economic activities but also has far reaching consequences for human right 
issues in North Korea. More specifically, they argue that because jobs are assigned in 
accordance with the policy and plans in North Korea, corruptions related to job assignment 
and maintenance are deeply entrenched in North Korea.
Furthermore, there also exists corruptions in food acquisition, in education opportunity, 
and in access to health. All these forms of corruptions raise income inequalities and class 
disparities and discriminations. They find that although corruptions in North Korea can 
provide positives such as greater freedom of movement, negatives may far outweigh the 
benefits of positives and it could negatively affect North Koreans’ human rights in the 
long-term. Indeed, in terms of wealth inequality, the price of apartment has increased 
substantially such that apartments in Pyongyang are about five to ten times more expensive 
than they were 10 years ago (Lankov, 2016). Such class divide and inequalities could be 
the trigger leading to social changes and opening of North Korea.
Given such development in North Korea, it would be prudent for South Korea to 
make preparations that can foster and facilitate transition to unification. Bennett (2017) 
argues that for the success of unification, it would be important to receive support from 
the North Korean elites, and to this end, it will be necessary to change the perception of 
North Korean elites who are indoctrinated to believe and fear that the unification would be 
catastrophic for their lives and status. Bennett argues that there should be plans to 
integrate North Korean elites into post-unification Korea in such a way that guarantees 
them of some form of socioeconomic status.
Otherwise, unification or any such process may be resisted inside North Korea.
The review of corruption in North Korea indicates that it is began as a way to make 
subsistence living after the economic crisis in the 1990s. Since then, corruption bred 
bottom-up driven marketization in North Korea and has created a new class of people 
amassing wealth through corrupt relationship with authorities and through market exchanges. 
Indeed, the marketization has been crucial in maintaining the fragile stability, but many 
scholars are wary of the possibility that such balance may not last in the long-term. What 
has been recurred historically is that rampant corruptions lead to destruction of communist 
regimes (Kim, 1997), and North Korea is also facing the same fate with its current 
situation.
CORRUPTION IN POST-COMMUNIST STATES
The long-term effects of this problem may be gauged from the fact that corruption 
posed a serious challenge in virtually every post-Communist country, even in such 
relatively successful cases of transition as Poland and Hungary. A report of the Open 
Society Institute summarized the negative heritage of the Communist era as follows: 
“traditions of both high-level grand corruption and low-level petty corruption; entrenched 
mistrust of the State; a feeling of legitimacy among the population in circumventing the 
State (‘beating the system’); widespread clientelism and forms of exchange that run against 
both formal political and bureaucratic norms and corruption in the private sector as a 
substitute for fair competition.”14) In countries where the legacy of the Communist regime 
was particularly unfavorable and/or there were hardly any pre-Communist traditions of 
democracy (like Albania and the Commonwealth of Independent States), these problems were 
even more serious.15) Furthermore, certain post-Communist countries continued to be affected 
by serious corruption problems long after their admission to the EU.
Problems of this kind were observed in the former East Germany, too, and they were 
14) Open Society Institute, “Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policy” (2002), p.43. 
Quoted in Patrycja Szarek-Mason, The European Union’s Fight Against Corruption. The Evolving Policy Towards 
Member States and Candidate Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 17.
15) For a comprehensive analysis, see Blendi Kajsiu, A Discourse Analysis of Corruption: Instituting Neoliberalism Against 
Corruption in Albania, 1998-2005 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).
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often directly associated with the privatization process that was managed by the agency 
named Treuhandanstalt (1990-1994).
The institutions of the EU quickly became aware of the gravity of the corruption 
problem.
During the process of EU enlargement (2004: admission of the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia; 2007: Bulgaria and Romania; 
2013: Croatia), the founding membe rs made sustained efforts to persuade (and, if 
necessary, compel) the candidate countries to improve their record in the sphere of 
corruption control.16) These regulative efforts may be compared to the measures that the 
ROK authorities will have to take in the northern provinces after unification. For this 
reason, it is worth examining how effective the EU’s pressure has been. It is an important 
question how much external demands could (or could not) shape the conduct of social, 
economic, and political actors in countries where corruption was deeply rooted, because if 
the need to adapt to EU norms did stimulate favorable changes in the transition countries 
(which expected that their admission would result in higher economic growth and living 
standards, and which thus had strong motivations to fulfill EU’s requirements), one can at 
least potentially expect analogous reactions from the social, economic, and political actors 
in the North Korean provinces. In such a scenario, the transition process of North Korean 
society would be relatively successful, provided that the ROK institutions made systematic 
and sustained efforts to control corruption in the former DPRK. If, however, EU’s 
demands could not make a sufficiently deep impact on the transition societies in Eastern 
Europe, it is reasonable to expect that corruption might remain a long-term problem in the 
North Korean provinces, too.
In the first stage of our research, we collected data from the World Bank database 
“Control of Corruption – Country Rankings”
(http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_corruption/).
The examined period covered the years from 1996 to 2015/2016, because the database 
contains only post-1996 country rankings as far as corruption control, government 
effectiveness, the rule of law, and other governance indicators are concerned.17) The 
collection of data was focused on twenty-eight post-Communist countries where the 
transition process resulted in the dismantlement of the old party-state (Central and 
16) Szarek-Mason, The European Union’s Fight Against Corruption, pp. 182-250.
17) In the case of certain countries, the World Bank database on corruption control does not cover the entire period from 
1996 to 2016, only the more recent years. Data collection on corruption perceptions started only in 2001.
Southeastern Europe, the Community of Independent States, and Mongolia). The transition 
countries still governed by Communist parties(China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba) were 
excluded from the investigation on the grounds that in a unified Korea, the KWP would 
no longer enjoy a position of political monopoly. We also collected data on North and 
South Korea to assess their present conditions and compare them to the transition 
countries. The World Bank data were based on public perceptions of the 
effectiveness/ineffectiveness of corruption control, rather than on the exact number of 
detected and/or prosecuted corruption cases. The database used a scale from 2.5 (highest; 
converted to 100%) to -2.5 (lowest; converted to 0%).
The preliminary findings of our investigation are the following:
The World Bank data fully confirm that corruption is indeed an extremely serious 
problem in North Korea. During the entire twenty-year period, North Korea’s record in 
corruption control has been even worse than that of those transition countries which were 
not admitted to the EU.
Of the non-EU transition countries, only Turkmenistan’s performance was occasionally 
worse than that of the DPRK (see Table 1). In global terms, the DPRK never achieved a 
rank better than 177. A minor short-term improvement was reported at the time of the 
July 2002 economic measures, followed by a fluctuating performance and, since 2009, by 
virtual stagnation. The counter-reforms of 2007-2008 seem to have made a particularly 
adverse impact on corruption control, but even in the post-2012 years (when there has 
been a limited progress in market-oriented economic policies), there was little sign of 
improvement (see Table 2).18) Judging from these patterns, no radical improvement can be 
expected under the present leadership. In case of a regime collapse, the ROK authorities 
will inherit a very serious situation.
Table 1. Corruption control in the non-admitted transition countries, North Korea, and South Korea
18) On the anti-market “counter-reforms,” see Andrei N. Lankov, “Pyongyang Strikes Back: North Korean Policies of 
2002-08 and Attempts to Reverse ‘De-Stalinization from Below’,” Asia Policy, 8 (2009), pp. 47-71.
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Year Albania Bosnia Macedon. Serbia Moldova Belarus Ukraine Russia Georgia Armenia
1996 2.82 4.30 3.08 2.94 4.60 3.14 2.94 2.96 2.22 4.06
1997 2.90 4.37 3.37 2.89 4.51 3.44 2.82 3.04 2.83 3.79
1998 2.98 4.44 3.66 2.84 4.42 3.74 2.7 3.12 3.44 3.52
1999 3.17 4.23 3.67 2.80 4.17 3.87 2.78 3.14 3.34 3.61
2000 3.36 4.02 3.68 2.76 3.92 4.00 2.86 3.16 3.24 3.70
2001 3.32 4.16 3.46 2.97 3.51 3.72 2.91 3.16 2.98 3.70
2002 3.28 4.30 3.24 3.18 3.10 3.44 2.96 3.16 2.72 3.70
2003 3.46 4.40 3.68 4.06 3.36 3.60 3.28 3.58 3.70 3.90
2004 3.66 4.38 4.02 4.04 3.02 3.16 3.22 3.52 3.78 3.78
2005 3.52 4.60 4.12 4.24 3.72 3.26 3.62 3.44 4.28 3.74
2006 3.36 4.40 4.26 4.44 3.88 3.74 3.64 3.30 4.94 3.82
2007 3.64 4.26 4.28 4.30 3.82 3.64 3.52 3.10 4.52 3.64
2008 3.90 4.30 4.68 4.40 3.86 3.72 3.42 2.90 4.56 3.74
2009 4.02 4.26 4.78 4.38 3.68 3.72 2.98 2.82 4.56 3.88
2010 4.02 4.36 4.88 4.42 3.64 3.54 3.04 2.88 4.76 3.70
2011 3.70 4.38 4.92 4.50 3.74 3.56 3.00 2.92 4.96 3.80
2012 3.60 4.42 5.04 4.38 3.80 3.96 2.94 2.96 5.52 3.96
2013 3.60 4.56 5.04 4.46 3.52 3.96 2.82 3.00 5.72 4.08
2014 3.9 4.44 5.18 4.62 3.3 4.36 3 3.26 6.48 4.12
2015 4.12 4.26 4.74 4.52 3.24 4.26 3.04 3.28 6.28 4.1
Year Azerb. Kazakh. Uzbek. Turkmen. Tajikistan Kyrgyz. Mongolia N. Korea S. Korea
1996 2.5 2.78 2.86 4.06 2.22 4.06 4.76 1.50 5.54
1997 2.63 2.95 2.89 3.61 2.40 4.05 4.65 1.49 5.61
1998 2.76 3.12 2.92 3.16 2.58 4.04 4.54 1.48 5.68
1999 2.79 3.00 3.05 3.13 2.74 3.79 4.37 1.44 5.59
2000 2.82 2.88 3.18 3.10 2.90 3.54 4.20 1.40 5.50
2001 2.86 2.88 3.10 2.88 2.92 3.41 4.59 2.03 5.72
2002 2.90 2.88 3.02 2.66 2.94 3.28 4.98 2.66 5.94
2003 3.10 3.04 2.98 2.80 2.96 3.20 4.66 1.54 5.96
2004 2.78 2.80 2.86 2.24 2.60 2.94 4.24 2.00 5.68
2005 3.02 3.02 2.64 2.14 2.82 2.66 3.84 2.22 6.18
2006 3.00 3.18 3.22 2.00 3.16 2.46 3.86 1.80 5.56
2007 2.94 3.18 3.16 2.06 3.18 2.50 3.74 1.42 6.04
2008 2.92 3.20 3.10 2.18 2.86 2.76 3.68 1.54 5.74
2009 2.78 3.24 2.56 2.08 2.74 2.54 3.48 2.26 5.96
2010 2.64 3.04 2.52 2.12 2.60 2.78 3.54 2.34 5.80
2011 2.76 3.04 2.38 2.12 2.72 2.70 3.64 2.26 5.92
2012 2.84 3.22 2.56 2.30 2.66 2.82 3.94 2.34 5.94
2013 3.20 3.20 2.54 2.32 2.62 2.74 4.04 2.34 6.10
2014 3.16 3.48 2.76 2.56 3.00 2.78 4.06 2.32 5.98
2015 3.36 3.48 2.68 2.48 3.00 2.84 4.06 2.42 5.98
Method of conversion: 2.5 = 10 (100%); 1.25 = 7.5 (75%); 0 = 5 (50%); -1.25 = 2.5 (25%); -2.5 = 0.
Table 2: Changes in corruption control in North Korea
1996-2000 C.C. 2001-2005 C.C. 2006-2010 C.C. 2011-2015 C.C.
1996 1.50 2001 2.03 2006 1.80 2011 2.26
1997 1.49 2002 2.66 2007 1.42 2012 2.34
1998 1.48 2003 1.54 2008 1.54 2013 2.34
1999 1.44 2004 2.00 2009 2.26 2014 2.32
2000 1.40 2005 2.22 2010 2.34 2015 2.42
Method of conversion: 2.5 = 10 (100%); 1.25 = 7.5 (75%); 0 = 5 (50%); -1.25 = 2.5 (25%); -2.5 = 0.
The experiences of the recently admitted EU members similarly indicate that corruption 
was, and still is, a particularly serious and persistent problem in transition economies. Of 
the countries, only a few (particularly Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) showed a pattern of 
gradual, significant, and irreversible improvement during a long period. It was more 
common that countries lost their initially favorable status and underwent a decline 
(Slovenia, Hungary), or their initial progress reached a ceiling, and later started to 
deteriorate or stagnate (Bulgaria, Croatia). In the first decade (1996-2006), positive or 
negative changes in performance were relatively more substantial than in the second decade 
(2007-2016), when the trajectories have become increasingly flat, implying that a sort of 
ceiling was reached and it was difficult to achieve further changes in social and political 
attitudes (see Table 3). These data seem to be in accordance with the World Bank’s 2006 
assessment, which concluded that “in the area of anti-corruption, EU conditionality worked 
best when accession was still not certain, particularly before the accession negotiations 
were concluded in 2002.”19)
Table 3: Corruption control in the transition countries that joined the EU in 2004-2013
19) Szarek-Mason, The European Union’s Fight Against Corruption, pp. 207-208.
Year Poland Czech R. Slovakia Hungary Estonia Latvia Lithuania Slovenia Romania Bulgaria Croatia
1996 6.08 6.30 5.72 6.16 4.88 3.36 4.88 7.64 4.56 3.44 3.36
1997 6.21 6.20 5.61 6.23 5.51 4.15 4.97 7.62 4.10 3.98 3.46
1998 6.34 6.10 5.50 6.30 6.14 4.94 5.06 7.60 3.64 4.52 3.56
1999 6.22 5.63 5.40 6.34 6.22 4.68 5.22 7.07 3.84 4.55 4.07
2000 6.10 5.16 5.30 6.38 6.30 4.42 5.38 6.54 4.04 4.58 4.58
2001 5.88 5.44 5.05 6.21 6.29 4.59 5.23 6.49 4.14 4.59 5.04
2002 5.66 5.72 4.80 6.04 6.28 4.76 5.08 6.44 4.24 4.60 5.50
2003 5.76 5.88 5.62 6.20 6.58 5.36 5.52 6.72 4.40 4.86 5.32
2004 5.22 5.76 5.78 6.30 6.84 5.28 5.64 7.04 4.48 5.20 5.40
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Method of conversion: 2.5 = 10 (100%); 1.25 = 7.5 (75%); 0 = 5 (50%); -1.25 = 2.5 (25%); -2.5 = 0.
In several post-Communist countries, the political elites’ desire to achieve admission to 
the EU did stimulate sustained efforts to control corruption. This was particularly 
significant in Estonia, where the new political elites emphatically rejected any close 
association with Russia and the Community of Independent States (CIS), promised “a clean 
break with the past,” and carried out privatization in a way that “that rapidly brought in 
Western managers and owners who both rejected corrupt practices and, in any case, were 
not members of any close-knit Estonian networks.” Their determination helped to make 
Estonia the least corrupt of the newly admitted EU members.20) An analogous situation 
could be observed in Georgia, where the “Rose Revolution” (2003), intertwined as it was 
with a shift from a pro-Russian alignment to close cooperation with the EU and NATO, 
led to the drastic replacement of the old elites (such as the summary dismissal of all 
police officers), which in turn resulted in a radical improvement in the sphere of 
corruption control (see Table 4).21) These rapid and substantial changes suggested that even 
such an extremely corrupt country as pre-2003 Georgia can be successfully “cleansed” if 
the new elites have a sufficiently strong motivation (that is, self-interest) to curb corruption 
and if the developed countries (like the EU) provide sufficient support to their 
anti-corruption policies.
20) Daunis Auers, Comparative Politics and Government of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 
the 21st Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 66-67, 136-144.
21) For an overview, see World Bank, Fighting Corruption in Public Services: Chronicling Georgia’s Reforms (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2012).
Year Poland Czech R. Slovakia Hungary Estonia Latvia Lithuania Slovenia Romania Bulgaria Croatia
2005 5.44 5.92 5.98 6.24 6.94 5.64 5.44 6.78 4.58 5.12 5.28
2006 5.34 5.62 5.80 6.22 6.92 5.58 5.16 7.04 4.68 4.80 5.18
2007 5.38 5.46 5.60 6.12 6.84 5.50 5.06 6.96 4.64 4.54 5.16
2008 5.70 5.54 5.60 5.76 6.74 5.26 5.08 6.82 4.68 4.40 4.92
2009 5.74 5.66 5.46 5.68 6.82 5.26 5.24 7.04 4.46 4.50 4.80
2010 5.82 5.52 5.48 5.50 6.72 5.26 5.54 6.70 4.56 4.58 4.94
2011 5.98 5.60 5.48 5.64 6.86 5.38 5.48 6.80 4.62 4.56 5.02
2012 6.18 5.46 5.14 5.56 6.98 5.32 5.64 6.64 4.48 4.52 4.92
2013 6.10 5.38 5.12 5.58 7.24 5.54 5.74 6.42 4.64 4.42 5.22
2014 6.18 5.64 5.24 5.26 7.54 5.68 5.96 6.38 4.72 4.44 5.38
2015 6.16 5.78 5.30 5.20 7.50 5.80 6.12 6.46 4.90 4.38 5.40
Table 4. Georgia versus the CIS countries: a politically motivated anti-corruption campaign
Year Russia Ukraine Belarus Moldova Georgia Armenia Azerb Kazakh Uzbek Turkmen Kyrgyz Tajik
2001 2.3 2.1 - 3.1 - - 2.0 2.7 2.7 - - -
2002 2.7 2.4 - 2.1 2.4 - 2.0 2.3 2.9 - - -
2003 2.7 2.3 - 2.4 1.8 3.0 1.8 2.4 2.4 - - -
2004 2.8 2.2 - 2.3 2.0 3.1 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.0 - -
2005 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.3 2.9 2.2 2.6 2.2 1.8 - 2.1
2006 2.5 2.8 2.1 3.2 2.8 2.9 2.4 2.6 2.1 2.2 - 2.2
2007 2.3 2.7 2.1 2.8 3.4 3.0 2.1 2.1 1.7 2.0 - 2.1
2008 2.1 2.5 2.0 2.9 3.9 2.9 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.8 - 2.1
2009 2.2 2.2 2.4 3.3 4.1 2.7 2.3 2.7 1.7 1.8 - 2
2010 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.9 3.8 2.6 2.4 2.7 1.6 1.6 - 2.1
2011 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.9 4.1 2.6 2.4 2.8 1.6 1.6 - 2.3
2012 2.8 2.6 3.1 3.6 5.2 3.4 2.7 2.8 1.7 1.7 2.4 2.2
2013 2.8 2.5 2.9 3.5 4.9 3.6 2.8 2.6 1.7 1.7 2.4 2.2
2014 2.7 2.6 3.1 3.5 5.2 3.7 2.9 2.9 1.8 1.7 2.7 2.3
2015 2.9 2.7 3.2 3.3 5.2 3.5 2.9 2.8 1.9 1.8 2.8 2.6
2016 2.9 2.9 4.0 3.0 5.7 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.1 2.2 2.8 2.5
Method of conversion: 2.5 = 10 (100%); 1.25 = 7.5 (75%); 0 = 5 (50%); -1.25 = 2.5 (25%); -2.5 = 0.
The beneficial effects of the “EU factor” should not be overestimated, however. If 
the expected date of admission was too distant or the chances of admission were too 
limited (as it was the case in Albania and Bosnia), political elites felt little incentive to 
pursue a strict anti-corruption policy, because such measures were bound to damage their 
patron-client networks but they could not guarantee a speedy admission process.22) In 
several countries (Bulgaria, Hungary), anti-corruption policies showed progress in the 
pre-admission phase and in the first years of membership, only to undergo a subsequent 
decline. Actually, the recent increase of corruption in Hungary was often directly linked 
to the country’s EU membership, since the availability of EU funding for local projects 
created incentives to win such tenders by unfair means. “EU funds represent much 
higher corruption risks than spending of Hungarian funds in spite of considerably more 
stringent regulation,” Mihály Fazekas, Lawrence Peter King, and István János Tóth 
conclude. “As corruption risks are particularly pronounced for large projects and for 
companies dependent on their political connections for winning contracts, EU 
funds-related corruption is most probably driven by national politics.”23)
22) International Crisis Group, “Bosnia’s Future.” Europe Report No. 232 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014), pp. 
15-16.
23) Mihály Fazekas, Lawrence Peter King, and István János Tóth, “Hidden Depths. The Case of Hungary.” ERCAS 
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These phenomena suggest that the unification of Korea and the influx of South 
Korean investments into the North might actually create new opportunities for corruption. 
Notably, the most valuable assets of the North Korean economy are the country’s rich 
mineral resources (gold, non-ferrous metals, iron, and so on), and resource-rich countries 
are often regarded to be particularly prone to corruption.24) Under such conditions, the 
acquisition of northern mineral resources by southern corporations might be accompanied 
by various forms of corruption.
Of the examined Communist countries, eight cases (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) were selected for a preliminary 
comparative examination to assess whether the implementation of corruption control posed 
a more serious challenge than other aspects of governance (government efficiency, 
regulatory quality, and rule of law), or a less serious one. These eight countries were 
selected on the grounds that their performance in the control of corruption showed 
relatively significant changes (either in a positive or a negative sense) during the 
examined period. Our findings indicate that controlling
corruption has proven relatively more difficult than improving other aspects of 
governance (for samples, see Tables 5-8). If there was any significant difference between 
a country’s performance in these four spheres, this usually meant that the country 
showed better progress in improving the effectiveness and regulatory quality of the 
government than in controlling corruption and ensuring the rule of law. Diverging 
performance in the four spheres was more common in the economically less developed 
countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia) than in the more developed ones 
(Hungary, Poland, Slovenia). North Korea’s performance in the other three spheres has 
been just as unfavorable as in corruption control. In the field of regulatory quality, the 
DPRK was recorded as the worst case in the world in several successive years. Judging 
from the trends described above, improving North Korea’s performance in corruption 
control would be a particularly difficult task, all the more so because North Korea also 
belongs to the category of less developed countries.
Table 5. Governance indicators (control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
Working Paper No. 36 (European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building, 2013), p. 79.
24) For various views about the relationship between corruption and resource abundance, see Nicholas Shaxson, “Oil, 
Corruption and the Resource Curse,” International Affairs, 83:6 (2007), pp. 1123-1140; Anja Franke, Andrea Gawrich, 
and Gurban Alakbarov, “Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as 
a Double ‘Curse’ in Post-Soviet Regimes,” Europe-Asia Studies, 61:1 (2009), pp. 109-140; and Hazel M. McFerson, 
“Governance and Hyper-Corruption in Resource-Rich African Countries,” Third World Quarterly, 30:8 (2009), pp. 
1529-1547. On North Korea as a resource-dependent economy, see Balázs Szalontai and Changyong Choi, “The 
Dilemmas of Dependency: China’s Controversial Role in North Korea’s Economic Transformation,” Asian Survey, 53:2 
(2013), pp. 269-291.
regulatory quality, rule of law) in Albania
Year Control Effective Regulation Rule of law
1996 2.82 3.40 4.16 3.14
1997 2.90 3.52 4.40 2.88
1998 2.98 3.62 4.62 2.60
1999 3.17 3.48 4.56 2.56
2000 3.36 3.34 4.48 2.52
2001 3.32 3.60 4.50 2.84
2002 3.28 3.86 4.50 3.16
2003 3.46 3.78 4.06 3.24
2004 3.66 4.12 4.68 3.48
2005 3.52 3.76 4.40 3.40
2006 3.36 4.08 4.80 3.54
2007 3.64 4.22 5.12 3.58
2008 3.90 4.30 5.30 3.72
2009 4.02 4.52 5.50 3.94
2010 4.02 4.46 5.46 4.12
2011 3.70 4.60 5.48 4.02
2012 3.60 4.46 5.40 3.92
2013 3.60 4.36 5.42 3.90
2014 3.90 4.86 5.46 4.26
2015 4.12 5.06 5.40 4.28
Table 6. Governance indicators (control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law) in Estonia
Year Control Effective Regulation Rule of law
1996 4.88 6.14 7.48 5.94
1997 5.51 6.10 7.46 6.00
1998 6.14 6.06 7.46 6.06
1999 6.22 6.24 7.52 6.10
2000 6.30 6.44 7.58 6.16
2001 6.29 6.44 7.68 6.34
2002 6.28 6.44 7.78 6.52
2003 6.58 6.86 7.60 6.50
2004 6.84 6.94 7.60 6.84
2005 6.94 6.98 7.58 6.84
2006 6.92 7.30 7.58 7.18
2007 6.84 7.08 7.72 7.24
2008 6.74 7.32 7.84 7.32
2009 6.82 7.06 7.80 7.18
2010 6.72 7.22 7.78 7.26
2011 6.86 7.20 7.78 7.32
2012 6.98 6.94 7.84 7.28
2013 7.24 7.00 7.90 7.36
2014 7.54 7.10 8.36 7.72
2015 7.50 7.18 8.34 7.66
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Table 7. Governance indicators (control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law) in Georgia
Year Control Effective Regulation Rule of law
1996 2.22 3.66 2.98 2.10
1997 2.83 3.70 3.52 2.10
1998 3.44 3.72 4.04 2.08
1999 3.34 3.62 4.14 2.42
2000 3.24 3.54 4.22 2.76
2001 2.98 3.4 3.84 2.72
2002 2.72 3.24 3.44 2.66
2003 3.70 4.00 3.76 3.00
2004 3.78 4.02 4.08 3.66
2005 4.28 4.16 3.80 3.56
2006 4.94 4.64 4.72 4.04
2007 4.52 5.26 5.58 4.32
2008 4.56 5.62 5.96 4.48
2009 4.56 5.56 6.00 4.58
2010 4.76 5.58 6.18 4.58
2011 4.96 6.10 6.32 4.74
2012 5.52 6.20 6.38 4.96
2013 5.72 6.16 6.52 4.98
2014 6.48 5.96 6.86 5.40
2015 6.28 5.80 6.84 5.60
Table 8. Governance indicators (control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law) in Hungary
Year Control Effective Regulation Rule of law
1996 6.16 6.68 6.70 6.66
1997 6.23 6.78 6.88 6.62
1998 6.30 6.88 7.06 6.58
1999 6.34 6.90 7.12 6.64
2000 6.38 6.92 7.18 6.70
2001 6.21 6.98 7.40 6.78
2002 6.04 7.04 7.62 6.86
2003 6.20 6.92 7.24 6.78
2004 6.30 6.80 7.32 6.78
2005 6.24 6.60 7.14 6.66
2006 6.22 6.76 7.42 6.92
2007 6.12 6.44 7.38 6.84
2008 5.76 6.42 7.40 6.78
2009 5.68 6.36 7.16 6.52
2010 5.50 6.34 7.04 6.50
2011 5.64 6.34 7.06 6.48
2012 5.56 6.26 6.98 6.20
2013 5.58 6.32 6.82 6.14
2014 5.26 6.06 6.50 6.00
2015 5.20 5.98 6.54 5.80
Criminality and Corruption in the Eastern Part of
Reunified Germany
While the experiences of the East European and post-Soviet transition countries do 
provide much insight into the problems with which the authorities of a reunified Korea 
will have to cope, in one important respect the aforesaid cases are not sufficiently similar 
to the situation of the post-unification northern provinces. As noted earlier, unification and 
democratization is expected to lead to the dismantlement of the North Korean state 
apparatus and to the extension of the South Korean state institutions to the North. In the 
transition countries, the previous state apparatus was rarely dismantled or purged in such a 
drastic way (Georgia and Estonia seem to have been more or less exceptional cases). 
Actually, the persistence of corruption was in many ways rooted in the patronage-ridden, 
reform-resistant state administration. From this perspective, the most valid analogy to 
post-unification North Korea is post-1990 East Germany, where the transition process did 
not merely dismantle the party-state but also reorganized the territorial administration (that 
is, it restored the pre-1952 federal system) and dismissed a substantial part of the East 
German officials, replacing them with West German ones. This process of “elite 
replacement” and “elite import” was of a fairly wide scope, particularly in spheres of 
“hard power.” In post-1990 Germany, East Germans were perceptively, though not 
drastically, underrepresented in the national elites.25)
For this reason, we examined the problems of criminality and corruption in the 
post-1990 East German areas, too. In the second phase of our project, we investigated if 
the eastern areas, composed of five “new” Länder (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Saxony, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Thuringia), showed any perceptively higher rates of 
criminality and/or corruption than the “old” Länder (that is, the areas belonging to 
pre-1990 West Germany), and whether the possible differences between the “old” and 
“new” Länder persisted for a long period, or not. By means of this analysis, we expected 
to find out how successful (or unsuccessful) the social integration of the East German 
population has been. If the East German areas were affected by an above-average rate of 
criminality and/or corruption for a considerable period, it can be reasonably expected that 
the post-unification North Korean provinces will be also affected by such problems. Our 
first examination, based on the Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik (Police Statistical Handbook of 
Criminal Offenses, an annual publication of the Bundeskriminalamt, the federal police 
authority), analyzed the “new” Länder as a single unit, and it covered the period from 
1991 to 2015. Our findings are presented in Table 9:
25) Hanjo Gergs und Markus Pohlmann, “Ökonomische Eliten vor und nach der Wiedervereinigung: Die Selektivität des 
Transfonnationsprozesses,” in Stefan Hornbostel (Hrsg.), Sozialistische Eliten. Horizontale und vertikale 
Differenzierungsmuster in der DDR (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1999), pp. 223-252.
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Table 9. Percentage of criminal offenses in the new Länder
Date
New Länder (Berlin excluded)
% of total German
population






compared to the % of
population)
1991 18.5 10.4 56.21
1992 18.1 17.2 95.02
1993 17.8 20.8 116.85
1994 17.6 21.4 121.59
1995 17.5 21.5 122.85
1996 17.3 21.0 121.38
1997 17.2 20.2 117.44
1998 17.2 20.2 117.44
1999 17.1 19.6 114.61
2000 17.0 19.0 111.76
2001 16.8 18.5 110.11
2002 16.7 17.8 106.58
2003 16.5 18.0 109.09
2004 16.4 17.3 105.48
2005 16.3 16.9 103.68
2006 16.2 16.6 102.46
2007 16.2 16.6 102.46
2008 15.9 16.3 102.51
2009 15.9 15.8 99.37
2010 15.9 16.0 100.62
2011 15.8 15.7 99.36
2012 15.6 16.1 103.2
2013 15.5 16.2 104.51
2014 15.5 16.0 103.22
2015 15.5 15.2 98.06
Bold numbers: over-representation. Source: Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik.
The data of Table 9 do indicate that the overall rate of criminal offenses was 
perceptively higher in the “new” Länder than the national average. Of the twenty-five 
years selected for examination, nineteen years showed above-average rates in the “new” 
Länder, and from 1993 to 2008, the overrepresentation of the “new” Länder was a 
constant, uninterrupted phenomenon.
This implies that the authorities of a unified Korea will probably face an analogous 
(or even more serious) situation in the northern provinces. At the same time, it can also 
be observed that the rates of “eastern” criminality peaked in 1994-1996, that is, in the 
immediate aftermath of unification, when the social disruption caused by privatization and 
mass unemployment was in its most severe phase. Since then, the overrepresentation of the 
“new” Länder has gradually decreased, though it required a minimum of 16 years to 
reduce the “eastern” rates of criminality to the level of national average.
These data might create the impression that the higher rates of “eastern” criminality 
were simply a legacy of the Communist era, that is, they reflected the divergent 
development of West and East Germany. However, an analysis that examines the five 
different Länder one by one shows a more complex picture (see Table 10):
Table 10: Percentage of criminal offenses in individual Länder
Date
Brandenburg Mecklenburg-V. Saxony Sachsen-Anhalt Thuringia
P C O/U P C O/U P C O/U P C O/U P C O/U
1991 3.2 2.2 68.75 2.4 1.8 75 6.0 2.5 41.6 3.6 2.0 55.5 3.3 1.8 54.54
1992 3.2 3.5 109.37 2.4 2.8 116.66 5.8 5.1 87.93 3.5 3.9 111.42 3.2 1.9 59.37
1993 3.1 4.9 158.06 2.3 3.8 165.21 5.7 5.3 92.98 3.5 4.5 128.57 3.1 2.4 77.41
1994 3.1 5.0 161.29 2.3 3.3 143.47 5.7 5.9 103.50 3.4 4.6 135.29 3.1 2.1 67.7
1995 3.1 4.6 148.38 2.2 3.3 150.0 5.6 6.0 107.14 3.4 4.8 141.17 3.1 2.8 90.32
1996 3.1 4.5 145.16 2.2 3.2 145.45 5.6 5.9 105.35 3.3 4.6 139.39 3.1 2.8 90.32
1997 3.1 4.4 141.93 2.2 3.2 145.45 5.5 5.5 100.0 3.3 4.5 136.36 3.0 2.6 86.66
199 3.1 4.3 138.71 2.2 3.2 145.45 5.5 5.7 103.63 3.3 4.4 133.33 3.0 2.7 90.0
1999 3.2 4.0 125 2.2 3.0 136.36 5.5 5.8 105.45 3.3 4.2 127.27 3.0 2.6 86.6
2000 3.2 4.1 128.12 2.2 2.9 131.81 5.4 5.6 103.7 3.2 3.9 121.87 3.0 2.5 83.33
2001 3.2 3.9 121.87 2.2 2.9 131.81 5.4 5.5 101.85 3.2 3.7 115.62 3.0 2.5 83.33
2002 3.1 3.8 122.58 2.1 2.7 128.57 5.3 5.2 98.11 3.1 3.6 116.12 2.9 2.6 89.65
2003 3.1 3.7 119.35 2.1 2.9 138.09 5.3 5.4 101.88 3.1 3.5 112,90 2.9 2.5 86.2
2004 3.1 3.6 116.13 2.1 2.7 128.57 5.2 5.1 98.07 3.1 3.4 109.67 2.9 2.5 86.2
2005 3.1 3.6 116.13 2.1 2.5 119.04 5.2 5.0 96.15 3.0 3.4 113.33 2.9 2.4 82.75
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P: % of total population in Germany; C: % of total number of criminal offenses in 
Germany; O/U: over-representation or under-representation of criminal offenses (% 
compared to the % of population); bold numbers: over-representation. Source: Polizeiliche 
Kriminalstatistik.
The data in Table 10 reveal significant differences between the individual eastern 
Länder. In certain Länder (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen-Anhalt), it took 
twenty to twenty-five years to reduce the rate of criminal offenses to the national average, 
even though the difference was never higher than 1 to 1.65. One can expect an even 
longer period (30-35 years at best) in North Korea, since the differences in corruption 
perceptions were always higher than 1 to 2.2, and sometimes they were as high as 1 to 
4.25 (see Table 14 and Table 15). In contrast, in some other Länder (Thuringia and 
Saxony), the rate of criminal offenses was quickly reduced to the national average or it 
never exceeded it. This shows the importance of regional differences, and implies that the 
high rates of criminality did not result solely from the long-term impact of the Communist 
past but also from the local social and economic conditions. This is highly relevant for 
North Korea, where the social and economic differences between certain 
regions(Pyongyang; Hwanghae; Chagang; Hamgyong) are fairly significant.
Date
Brandenburg Mecklenburg-V. Saxony Sachsen-Anhalt Thuringia
P C O/U P C O/U P C O/U P C O/U P C O/U
2006 3.1 3.5 112.9 2.1 2.4 114.28 5.2 4.9 94.23 3.0 3.4 113.33 2.8 2.4 85.71
2007 3.1 3.6 116.13 2.1 2.4 114.28 5.2 4.9 94.23 3.0 3.4 113.33 2.8 2.3 82.14
2008 3.1 3.4 109.67 2.0 2.4 120.0 5.1 4.8 94.11 2.9 3.4 117.24 2.8 2.3 82.14
2009 3.1 3.3 106.45 2.0 2.3 115.0 5.1 4.6 90.19 2.9 3.3 113.79 2.8 2.3 82.14
2010 3.1 3.4 109.67 2.0 2.2 110.0 5.1 4.9 96.07 2.9 3.2 110.34 2.8 2.3 82.14
2011 3.1 3.3 106.45 2.0 2.1 105.0 5.1 4.9 96.07 2.9 3.1 106.89 2.7 2.3 85.18
2012 3.0 3.3 110.0 2.0 2.1 105.0 5.1 5.2 101.96 2.8 3.2 114.28 2.7 2.3 85.18
2013 3.0 3.3 110.0 2.0 2.0 100.0 5.0 5.2 104.0 2.8 3.3 117.85 2.7 2.4 88.88
2014 3.0 3.2 106.66 2.0 1.9 95.0 5.0 5.4 108.0 2.8 3.2 114.28 2.7 2.3 85.18
2015 3.0 3.0 100.0 2.0 1.9 95.0 5.0 5.0 100.0 2.8 3.1 110.71 2.7 2.2 81.48
Table 11. Detected cases of corruption and abuse of authority per 100.000 inhabitants
Date Germany (total) Old Länder New Länder
1998 9 9 8
1999 8 8 9
2000 10 11 8
2001 9 9 9
2002 8 8 9
2003 7 7 7
2004 7 7 7
2005 7 6 8
2006 7 7 10
2007 8 7 11
2008 8 7 10
2009 No data No data No data
2010 8 7 11
2011 6 6 10
Bold numbers: over-representation. Source: Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik.
Table 3 is specifically focused on the problem of corruption. Of the thirteen years 
examined, eight years showed above-average rates of corruption in the new Länder. The 
maximum difference between the new and old Länder was 7 to 11 (157.14%) and 6 to 10 
(166.66%). Tables 4-5 are also focused on corruption, but their source is the annual 
publication titled Bundeslagebild Korruption, whose data were collected by different 
methods, and thus they cannot be directly compared to the data of the Polizeiliche 
Kriminalstatistik (PKS). Still, Table 11 also indicates that in the sphere of detected 
corruption cases, the new Länder were partly overrepresented. Of the eighteen years 
selected, twelve years showed rates higher than the national average. On the level of 
individual Länder, the Bundeslagebild data on corruption show only a limited overlap with 
the PKS data on overall rates of criminality. In Brandenburg, both rates were high for a 
long period; in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the number of corruption cases started to 
decline several years before the overall rate of criminal offenses decreased to the national 
average; and in Saxony and Thuringia, overall rates were fairly low but there were still 
some major corruption scandals.
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Table 12. Detected cases of corruption in the new Länder (source: Bundeslagebild 
Korruption)
Date New Länder (Berlin excluded)
% of total German
population
% of total number of





compared to the % of
population)
1994 17.6 24 136.36
1995 17.5 22.99 131.37
1996 17.3 15.33 88.61
1997 17.2 14.28 83.02
1998 17.2 7.71 44.82
1999 17.1 15.16 88.65
2000 17.0 28.53 167.82
2001 16.8 26.57 158.15
2002 16.7 23.8 142.51
2003 16.5 19.5 118.18
2004 16.4 25.7 156.7
2005 16.3 22.95 140.79
2006 16.2 29.26 180.61
2007 16.2 21.99 135.74
2008 15.9 15.24 95.84
2009 15.9 15.21 95.66
2010 15.9 21.05 132.38
2011 15.8 24.26 153.54
Table 13. Detected cases of corruption in the individual Länder
(source: Bundeslagebild Korruption)
Date
Brandenburg Mecklenburg-V. Saxony Sachsen-Anhalt Thuringia
P C S P C S P C S P C S P C S
1994 3.1 11 4.26 2.3 15 5.81 5.7 17 6.58 3.4 10 3.87 3.1 9 3.48
1995 3.1 2 0.68 2.2 13 4.46 5.6 27 9.27 3.4 9 3.09 3.1 16 5.49
1996 3.1 5 1.21 2.2 10 2.43 5.6 33 8.04 3.3 4 0.97 3.1 11 2.68
199 3.1 8 0.80 2.2 59 5.94 5.5 51 5.13 3.3 16 1.61 3.0 8 0.80
1998 3.1 9 0.83 2.2 7 0.65 5.5 35 3.26 3.3 20 1.86 3.0 12 1.11
1999 3.2 45 4.35 2.2 34 3.28 5.5 39 3.77 3.3 20 1.93 3.0 19 1.83
2000 3.2 54 4.34 2.2 38 3.05 5.4 86 6.91 3.2 114 9.17 3.0 63 5.06
2001 3.2 47 3.67 2.2 53 4.14 5.4 97 7.58 3.2 43 3.36 3.0 100 7.82
2002 3.1 104 6.17 2.1 57 3.38 5.3 60 3.56 3.1 58 3.44 2.9 121 7.18
2003 3.1 54 4.9 2.1 31 2.81 5.3 67 6.09 3.1 23 2.09 2.9 37 3.36
2004 3.1 79 6.54 2.1 20 1.65 5.2 158 13.09 3.1 23 1.9 2.9 29 2.4
2005 3.1 97 5.88 2.1 30 1.81 5.2 171 10.36 3.0 26 1.57 2.9 55 3.33
2006 3.1 87 5.4 2.1 10 0.62 5.2 155 9.63 3.0 205 12.74 2.8 14 0.87
2007 3.1 183 11.44 2.1 7 0.43 5.2 91 5.69 3.0 51 3.18 2.8 20 1.25
2008 3.1 95 5.25 2.0 8 0.44 5.1 62 3.42 2.9 94 5.19 2.8 17 0.94
2009 3.1 160 8.40 2.0 11 0.57 5.1 48 2.52 2.9 33 1.73 2.8 38 1.99
2010 3.1 237 13.07 2.0 14 0.77 5.1 59 3.25 2.9 54 2.97 2.8 18 0.99
2011 3.1 208 13.61 2.0 6 0.39 5.1 87 5.69 2.9 43 2.81 2.7 27 1.76
P: % of total population in Germany; C: number of detected corruption cases; S: share (%) of the total number 
of detected corruption cases
Table 14. Perceptions of corruption control on a scale from 2.5 to -2.5, converted to 
percentages(source: World Bank)
Date South Korea North Korea Proportion
1996 0.27 = 55.4 -1.75 = 15 3.69:1
1998 0.34 = 56.8 -1.76 = 14.8 3.83:1
2000 0.25 = 55.0 -1.80 = 14 3.92:1
2002 0.47 = 59.4 -1.17 = 26.6 2.23:1
2003 0.48 = 59.6 -1.73 = 15.4 3.85:1
2004 0.34 = 56.8 -1.50 = 20 2.84:1
2005 0.59 = 61.8 -1.39 = 22.2 2.78
2006 0.28 = 55.6 -1.60 = 18 3.08:1
2007 0.52 = 60.4 -1.79 = 14.2 4.25:1
2008 0.37 = 57.4 -1.73 = 15.4 3.72:1
2009 0.48 = 59.6 -1.37 = 22.6 2.63:1
2010 0.40 = 58.0 -1.33 = 23.4 2.47:1
2011 0.46 = 59.2 -1.37 = 22.6 2.61:1
2012 0.47 = 59.4 -1.33 = 23.4 2.53:1
2013 0.55 = 61.0 -1.33 = 23.4 2.60:1
2014 0.49 = 59.8 -1.34 = 23.2 2.57:1
2015 0.49 = 59.8 -1.29 = 24.2 2.47:1
Table 15. The gap between corruption control in South Korea and North Korea
1996-2000 C.C. 2001-2005  C.C. 2006-2010  C.C. 2011-2015 C.C.
1996 5.54 2001 5.72 2006 5.56 2011 5.92
ROK 1997 5.61 2002 5.94 2007 6.04 2012 5.94
1998 5.68 2003 5.96 2008 5.74 2013 6.10
1999 5.59 2004 5.68 2009 5.96 2014 5.98
2000 5.50 2005 6.18 2010 5.80 2015 5.98
1996-2000 C.C. 2001-2005  C.C. 2006-2010  C.C. 2011-2015 C.C.
1996 1.50 2001 2.03 2006 1.80 2011 2.26
DPRK 1997 1.49 2002 2.66 2007 1.42 2012 2.34
1998 1.48 2003 1.54 2008 1.54 2013 2.34
1999 1.44 2004 2.00 2009 2.26 2014 2.32
2000 1.40 2005 2.22 2010 2.34 2015 2.42
